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Integral Salvation in the Risen Christ: the New
“Emergent Whole”
 _____________________________________________
H e n r y  L .  N o v e l lo
Abstract: This essay examines current mind-body theories and argues that
“emergentist monism” is preferable to “nonreductive physicalism” in the
search for an adequate model of personhood.  It demonstrates the
compatibility of the emergentist account of evolving nature with Karl
Rahner’s notion of “active self-transcendence”, and the need to appreciate
the “integral” character of final salvation understood as participation,
through the Spirit, in the divine identity of the risen Christ who is the new
definitive “emergent whole” in person.  The essay concludes with the
proposition that integral salvation in Christ is fully actualised in the
privileged event of death as the gift of “admirable exchange” of natures in
the person of the risen One.
THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM has engaged the minds of philosophers
down the centuries and shows no signs of abating in our own time.
Plato taught that the soul inhabits the body as a material dwelling place,
but the final end of the soul is to exist independently of the body in the
eternal realm beyond space and time.  The somewhat loose connection
between body and soul in Platonic thought was tightened up by
Aristotelian philosophy’s doctrine of material and formal causality,
according to which the soul, as the form of the body, can have no
independent existence from the material body.  Both of these schools, in
spite of their differences, offered indispensable elements of an
anthropology demanded by the Christian faith.  For what needed to be
formulated was an anthropology which acknowledged that the human
being, in its unified totality, is created by God, and at the same time it
was required to distinguish between an element that perishes in the
human and one that abides, in such a way that it was possible to satisfy
both the belief in life with Christ beyond death, and the incompleteness
of the intermediate life prior to the resurrection of the body at the end of
time.  In sum, the anthropology desired “should weld together Plato
and Aristotle precisely at the points where their doctrines were mutually
opposed”.1
                                                                                            
1. Joseph Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life in Johann Auer and Joseph
Ratzinger (eds.), Dogmatic Theology 9 (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of
America, 1988) 148.
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The task was to take on board Aristotle’s doctrine on the inseparable
unity of body and soul, but without undermining the spiritual nature of
the soul, that is, without making the soul wholly dependent upon matter
for being what it is – the soul could not be interpreted as an “entelechy”.
It required the mind of Thomas Aquinas to resolve this seemingly in-
surmountable difficulty by the development of his formula anima forma
corporis: the soul is the form of the body.  At first glance this formula
may appear to be identical to Aristotle’s teaching that the soul is wholly
tied to matter and thus cannot be something individual or personal.  But
for Thomas this formula contains the twofold affirmation that the soul is
something personal and also the form of the body.  The soul belongs to
the body as form, yet that which is the form of the body is still spirit, in
which case the human being can be thought of as a person and as open
to immortality, although the latter is not something that is intrinsic to
human nature; it is not something that is achieved by the human, but
rests wholly on the power of God who creates out of nothing.  The
formula anima forma corporis is designed to reinforce the fundamental
point that the very essence of the human being is its indelible relation-
ship to the sovereign God who has called it into existence.
In Thomas’s interpretation of the formula, while body and soul are
entities that constitute an inseparable unity, they are nevertheless not
identical, from which follows two important consequences for a
Christian anthropology: firstly, the soul can never be fully separated
from its relationship to matter, hence the resurrection of the body can be
seen as a postulate of human existence; secondly, human identity cannot
be reduced to matter, rather the identity of the living body derives from
its being formed by the expressive power of the soul.  The notion of the
body as the corporeal expression of the soul makes it possible to
distinguish between “physiological unit” and “bodiliness”.2  The latter
is something more than the mere summation of corpuscles for it implies
that the soul is not complete on its own but tends towards embodiment,
without which there can be no sense-perceptions, no movement, no
feelings, no real interaction with others; and, vice versa, it implies that
the body is not altogether discrete since its identity derives from the
expressive power of the soul which is directly created by God.
Thomas’s central insight regarding the inseparable unity of body and
soul is certainly not without relevance for our time inasmuch as it
emphasises the psychosomatic unity of the person and that what bears
the enduring identity of the person (the “soul”) is not wholly dependent
upon matter for being what it is (the “spiritual” nature of the soul).  Yet
it would fair to say that few today would accept Thomas’s formula just
as it stands, for we can no longer think of God directly creating a
                                                                                            
2. Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, 179.
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“rational soul” so as to make the human species distinct from the infra-
human species.  In the current climate we must take seriously the
evidence indicating that new species emerge in the course of
evolutionary history.  Within such a processive and dynamic
framework, the need arises to treat the uniquely human capacities for
rational, moral, and spiritual activity as “emergent properties”, which is
to say that they are genetically conditioned, although they are not to be
viewed as genetically determined.3  The reference to “properties” is
significant because it implies the rejection of a mental “substance” to
account for the mental life of the human being.  What is in view here is a
strictly monistic view of the human being where there is simply no
room for entertaining the notion of a dualism of substance.  This means
that statements made by biologists or neuroscientists about the physical
nature of the human are about exactly the same entity as statements made
by theologians about the spiritual nature of the person.  We are faced
today, though, with reductionistic or materialistic forms of monism, and
those engaging in the science-faith dialogue from the perspective of faith
repudiate these forms of monism, espousing instead positions such as
“nonreductive physicalism” and “emergentist monism”.
The first part of this essay will discuss current theories pertaining to
the mind-body debate, including “identity” theory, “epiphenomen-
alism”, “correlation” theory, “nonreductive physicalism”, and “emer-
gentist monism”, with the intention of illustrating why emergentist
monism is the best model of personhood on offer today.  The second
section will be concerned with showing the compatibility of the emer-
gentist model of personhood with Karl Rahner’s understanding of the
process of “active self-transcendence” which he portrays as giving rise
to the attainment or leap to a “higher” nature.  It will be suggested that
Rahner’s thought can be enhanced by portraying this process as the
work of the Spirit whose “proper” role is that of bringing all creatures
into ecstatic union with the triune God as their final end.  The final part
of this essay will discuss consequences of the findings of the previous
two sections for our understanding of the essence of the Christian faith
and final salvation in the risen One who is the new “emergent whole” in
person.  It will be argued that the integral dimensions of the complex
reality of the human person as agent, as relation, and as subject, can be
seen as corresponding to the physical, moral, and eschatological aspects
of integral salvation in the glorified Christ, respectively.  The essay will
conclude with the proposition that the “not yet” of God’s promises
revealed through the risen Lord will be made good in the saving event
                                                                                            
3. For a recent collection of essays on scientific and theological portraits of human
nature, see Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy and H. Newton Malony (eds.), Whatever
Happened to the Soul? (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998).
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of our own death as a dying into the death of Christ who has
transformed integral death into “new” life.
1. CONTEMPORARY MIND-BODY THEORIES: EMERGENTIST MONISM
In reaction to the strong dualism which holds that body and soul are
such distinct substances that the soul has a separate existence to the
physical body, which reached a climactic point with Cartesian meta-
physical or psychophysical dualism, there has emerged in the modern
period the position of reductive materialism: there is no “ghost in the
machine” said Gilbert Ryle, there is just the machine.  Materialists such
as Ryle believe that soon we will be able to understand and control the
electrochemical processes in the brain, so that all our experiences will be
shown to be determined by physical states of the brain.  This identi-
fication of mental activity and brain activity, which is known as the
mind-brain “identity” theory, amounts to complete determinism and the
wholesale removal of human responsibility and guilt, in which case the
personal dimension of human existence is destroyed.4  But the Achilles’
heel of this reductionist argument is that it is simply irreconcilable with
the undeniable empirical facts: that is to say, the facts of self-con-
sciousness and the awareness of an enduring “I” which is more than a
chronological sequence of human experiences (person as subject), the
need to exercise free-will in enacting one’s thoughts and intentions
(person as agent), and the facts of moral activity and obligation in
forging meaningful relations with others (person as relation).5  The
conscious human agent must assume what philosophers call “onto-
logical priority”, for mental phenomena have the quality of
intentionality: “The simple definition of intentionality is aboutness; it is
the characteristic of referring to something else.  The referring
relationship is intrinsically different from the causal relationship, where
A causes B to occur.”6 All human knowledge is acquired only by way of
our experience and activity as conscious agents marked with the quality
of intentionality, hence it is important to appreciate just how compelling
is the argument that “consciousness as a fact of experience withstands
any form of reductionism”.7
                                                                                            
4. Keith Ward, in his work Defending the Soul (Oxford: Oneworld, 1992) 137, points out
that in this view law courts will eventually be replaced by panels of psychiatrists and brain
surgeons who will deliberate about how to modify an individual’s behaviour (social
manipulation).
5. This fundamentally important point is stressed, for example, amongst many others,
by Russell Aldwinckle, Death in the Secular City (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972) 68-
81.
6. Philip Clayton, “Neuroscience, the Person, and God: An Emergentist Account”, in
Robert J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, Theo C. Meyering, and Michael A. Arbib (eds.),
Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action (Vatican City: Vatican
Observatory Publications, 1999) 181-214, at 191.
7. Malcolm Jeeves, “Brain, Mind, and Behaviour”, in Whatever Happened to the Soul?, 90.
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The reductionist programme is further plagued by the problem that
in the end it subverts itself because it destroys rationality by replacing
thought with electrochemical neural events which cannot confront one
another in rational discourse; such events are neither right nor wrong,
but just happen.8  How can any argument be rational if intellectual
freedom is done away with? The problems inherent in the mind-brain
identity theory apply equally to the “epiphenomenalist” thesis
according to which mental activity is an epiphenomenon or byproduct
of the physical activity of the brain, in which case the states of my brain
determine the states of my mind, but never vice versa.  The mind as an
epiphenomenon is unilaterally dependent upon the physical brain.  As
with the mind-brain identity theory, the epiphenomenalist thesis suffers
from the fundamental flaw that it does not accord with the facts of
practical experience: mind influences body as much as body influences
mind, which suggests that human consciousness is intimately related to
both kinds of entity which are in continuous interaction.  In other words,
the empirical facts seem to point strongly in the direction of some kind
of mind-brain “correlation”, not identity or epiphenomenalism.
Research findings relating to the vexing problem of the mind-brain
relationship point to an ever tightening link between brain activity and
mind activity.  In light of these findings, which must not immediately be
taken as support for causal reductionism or reductive materialism,
many today believe that a case can be made for affirming only one set of
events; that is, it is most fruitful to regard mental activity and correlated
brain activity “as inner and outer aspects of one complex set of events
which together constitute conscious human agency”.9  In this per-
spective, mental activity is regarded as embodied in brain activity, but not
identical with it, so that while it is conceded that there is an irreducible
duality of human nature, this duality is not one of substance, but a
“duality of aspects”.10  This clearly amounts to a monistic portrayal of
human nature; however it is distinct from the monism of the mind-brain
identity theory inasmuch as it acknowledges an irreducible duality of
human nature.  The term nonreductive physicalism has recently been
coined to express this portrait of human nature.11  To put it briefly, this
                                                                                            
8. This point is highlighted by John Polkinghorne, One World (London: SPCK, 1986)
and John Hick, Death and Eternal Life (London: Collins, 1976) 117.
9. Jeeves, “Brain, Mind, and Behaviour”, 89.
10. Arthur Peacocke, it is worth noting, says that the only duality of substance
(ontological dualism) to which theists can commit themselves is that between God and the
world.  The “world-as-a-whole” or “all-that-is” refers to all that is created, all that is not
God.  See his essay, “The Sound of Silence: How Does God Communicate With
Humanity?” in Neuroscience and the Person, 234.
11. The publication Whatever Happened to the Soul? is committed to this view. Nancey
Murphy, in her essay “Nonreductive Physicalism: Philosophical Issues”, at 129-30, explains
that this term refers to a constellation of positions: (i) the acceptance of ontological
reductionism = the claim that no new kinds of metaphysical “ingredients” (e.g. “life force”,
“entelechy”, “mind”, “soul”) need to be added to produce higher-level entities from the
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is the view that “the human nervous system, operating in concert with
the rest of the body in its environment, is the seat of consciousness ....
Consciousness and religious awareness are emergent properties and they
have top-down causal influence on the body.”12  The talk of “emergent
properties” is significant because it serves to indicate that the “higher”
human characteristics such as rationality, morality, and spiritual
activity, while genetically conditioned, remain a matter of personal
choice.  What we traditionally refer to as “soul” designates the human’s
emergent capacity for personal relatedness, a capacity which is
dependent upon, but not reducible to, the neurophysiological structural
features enabling enhanced intelligence and higher forms of cognition.13
The difference between reductive and nonreductive physicalism can
be stated by appealing to an important distinction made in philosophy
of mind between “type identity” and “token identity”.14  The latter is
the thesis that every mental event or property is identical with some
physical event or other, which is perhaps better expressed by saying that
every mental event is realised by some physical event, but is not identical
to it; while the former is a stronger thesis to the effect that every type of
mental event (for instance, a type of sensation, such as pain) is identical
with a type of physical event (a particular type of neuron firing).
Notwithstanding this distinction, some thinkers have reservations about
the label “nonreductive physicalism” because those who adopt this label
tend to talk about the “physical realisation” of mental events, which is
deemed to be questionable insofar as it may give the impression of
assigning insufficient ontological commitment to the reality of the
“emergent whole” and of not attributing causal powers to the higher
level whole.  Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke, for example, therefore
argue that it is better to use the label emergentist monism instead of
nonreductive physicalism, since the former more adequately expresses
an ontological commitment to the reality of the emergent whole of a
                                                                                                                                    
lower; (ii) the rejection of causal reductionism = the view that all causation in the hierarchy
of levels is “bottom-up”; (iii) the rejection of reductive materialism  = the view that the
higher-level entities are nothing but the sum of their parts, thus only the lower-level
entities are really real.  Nonreductive physicalists build upon the seminal work of the
American philosopher Roy W. Sellars, The Philosophy of Physical Realism (New York: Russell
& Russell, 1932).
12. Nancey Murphy, “Nonreductive Physicalism: Philosophical Issues”, 131.  Emphasis
added.
13. Francisco J. Ayala, in his essay “Human Nature: One Evolutionist’s View”, Whatever
Happened to the Soul?, 43, says that ethical behaviour derives from the “eminent intellectual
capacity of human beings”; and Warren S. Brown, in his essay “Cognitive Contributions to
Soul,” in the same publication, outlines a number of human capacities that are critical for
personal relatedness, including language, a theory of mind, episodic memory, conscious
top-down causality, future orientation, and emotional modulation (pp. 103ff).
14. See Owen Flanagan, The Science of Mind  (2nd ed.; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1991) 218.
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given total system.15  Peacocke is keen to extend and enrich the notion
of causality beyond the simple notion of a regular chain of events,
especially in light of new insights into the way complex systems, such as
biological ones, behave.  He suggests using the term “whole-part
influence” in order to more effectively convey the “net effect of all those
ways in which the system-as-a-whole, operating from its ‘highest’ level,
is a causal factor in what happens to its constituent parts, the ‘lower’
level”.16  The label emergentist monism is intended to emphasise the
reality of “top-down” effects from whole to part, without ignoring, of
course, the “bottom-up” effects of parts on wholes.  To my mind, the
label does have the merit of conveying this emphasis more effectively
than the phrase “nonreductive physicalism” which, by adopting the
term “physicalism”, seems to suggest that the focus is more on the
causal powers of the lower level rather than on the whole-part influence
of the higher level.
Clayton makes an important clarification in regard to emergentist
monism when he explains that while it breaks with dualism and asserts
no need to introduce nonphysical entities such as souls into the portrait
of human nature, this nonetheless does not amount to the acceptance of
“ontological reductionism” as proposed by physicalists.  The reason
emergentists cannot support reductionism even with respect to
ontological questions hinges on their central assertion that “the history
of the universe is one of development and process.  The one order exists
at each stage in its history, but what it is that exists is not identical
through time.  Genuinely new properties emerge which are not
reducible to what came before, although they are continuous with it.”17
In other words, it seems that the emergentists are wanting to say that the
new species which emerge during the course of evolutionary history
represent an increase of being (greater ontological reality) in relation to
the previously existing reality from which it has emerged.  This being
the case, the major emphasis of the emergentists calls to mind Karl
Rahner’s understanding of the evolutionary process of becoming based
upon his notion of “active self-transcendence”, which will be discussed
in section 2 below.
In the case of the human species, what emerges is a particular
psychosomatic unity, a complex organism in which mental phenomena
“supervene” upon physical processes.  The concept of “supervenience”
is an important one in the mind-body debate because it demonstrates
the possibility of accepting some form of ontological reductionism
without at the same time falling into “causal reductionism” which not
                                                                                            
15. Clayton, “Neuroscience, the Person, and God”, 209-11; Peacocke, “The Sound of
Sheer Silence”, 217-20.
16. Peacocke, “The Sound of Sheer Silence”, 221.
17. Clayton, “Neuroscience, the Person, and God”, 211.
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only undermines the traditional conceptions of free-will and
personhood, but also threatens the meaningfulness of intellectual
endeavours.  Supervenience, simply put, grants the dependence of mental
phenomena on physical phenomena while denying the reducibility of the mental
to the physical, in which case supervenience has to do with properties or
groups of phenomena, not relations between substances.  There is as yet,
however, no agreement on the concept’s proper definition, and so I
think it will be better to steer clear of definitions for the purposes of this
essay and focus instead on two discernible tendencies in the formulation
of the concept: namely, what Clayton calls “strong” and “weak”
supervenience.18  Those views of supervenience where the physical
determines the mental not merely in its emergence but also in all its
subsequent behaviour (the mental as mere epiphenomenon) represent a
strong form of the concept.  Such a position leaves no room for genuine
mental causes, since all the determination of outcomes is seen as flowing
from the physical substratum, so that any given mental event could be
predicted if sufficient knowledge of the brain, its structure, and its past
and present inputs, were available.  The problem with this form of
supervenience, as already stressed, is that it simply does not accord with
the facts of self-consciousness and the person’s intentionality, that is, the
referring to something else, or, to put it differently, the referring to the
world of “otherness” (both the cosmos and other persons).
What is required is the formulation of a “weak” version of super-
venience where the central tenet of the theory remains intact, yet at the
same time it is argued that the underlying physical state of affairs is not
sufficient for explaining the emergent properties of the higher-level
entity: the physical does not fully or solely determine the outcome of the
mental life, in which case genuine mental causation is safeguarded.  This
particular view is referred to as emergentist supervenience, a label which is
intended to express a “whole-part” causative relation or influence, and
which gives rise to an emergentist theory of personhood.  According to
the emergentist theory, the human person is “the highest level, the
whole, in that unique system which is the human-brain-in-the-human-
                                                                                            
18. Clayton, “Neuroscience, the Person, and God”, 199-202.  Nancey Murphy, in her
essay “Nonreductive Physicalism: Philosophical Issues”, cites the following works as
evidence of the wide use of the concept of supervenience in the philosophy of mind:
Jaegwon Kim, Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993); John Heil, The Nature of True Minds (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992); and David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a
Fundamental Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).  While there is no
agreement on the concept’s proper definition, Murphy offers her own “complex”
definition: “Property S is supervenient on property B [base property] if and only if
something instantiates S in virtue of [as a non-causal consequence of] its instantiating B
under circumstance c” (p. 134).  Her emphasis on “circumstances” serves to illustrate how
the concept of supervenience can be extended to include ethical and religious predicates,
so that the emergent properties of the human remain a matter of personal choice.
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body-in-social-relations”.19  The exercise of personal agency by indi-
viduals in the pursuit of personal identity is the most powerful instance
of whole-part influence which is exerted on both their bodies and the
surrounding world of otherness.
At this point in the discussion it will be helpful to summarise key
points held by emergentists who basically share the view of the
physicalists, although there are some notable differences in emphases
which illustrate why, in my opinion, the label emergentist monism is
preferable to nonreductive physicalism.  (1) The world is fundamentally
one, there is a basic unity of nature, yet what it is  that exists is not the
same through time, for new properties emerge which are not reducible
to the previously existing reality, so that we must assign clear
ontological commitment to the reality of the emergent whole of a given
total system.  (2) This means that we must be wary of the term “onto-
logical reductionism” because it seems to undermine the appropriate
commitment to the ontological reality of the new emergent whole.  In
light of the multiple layers of ontological reality in a complex system, it
would be better to speak of ontological pluralism in order to more
effectively convey the many interrelated, but not mutually reducible,
aspects of a given complex system.  (3) With respect to the life of the
human mind, then, study cannot be restricted to the acquisition of
knowledge of the brain and its workings, for the mental life demands
that it be described and expounded in terms intrinsic to itself : thoughts
and actions have the quality of intentionality which points to a referring
relationship, to continuous engagement with the world of otherness, not
a causal relationship.  (4) The notion of top-down causation of the
emergent whole of a complex system is better referred to as whole-part
influence.  The term “causation” tends to be understood in a Humean
sense as denoting a chain of causally related events, which fails to
appreciate the wider use of causation applicable to the way complex
systems generally behave.  (5) What emerges in the case of the human
person is a particular psychosomatic unity which is the supreme exemplar
of whole-part influence.  Each of the layers (physical, biological,
psychological, social, and spiritual) in the complex whole that is the
person needs to be understood by a science appropriate to that level,
and while the constituent levels of the person are interdependent, they
are not to be regarded as mutually reducible.  It is through the exercise
of agency that the person strives to integrate all the levels of the complex
system which is the human-brain-in-the-body-in-social-relations, so as
to realise personal identity and integrity.
I believe that emergentist monism, and nonreductive physicalism
upon which it builds, are important new schools of thought which go
beyond the hitherto commonly held positions regarding the mind-brain
                                                                                            
19. Peacocke, “The Sound of Sheer Silence”, 232.
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problem, namely, dualism of substance, identity theory, epiphenomen-
alism, and mere correlation.  While much still remains to be done in
order to clarify emergentist monism and to relate it to the sciences and
to fields such as ethics and theology, some important steps have been
taken in this direction by arguing for an “ontological holism” that is not
causally reductionist, so that freedom, personhood, and the
meaningfulness of our intellectual efforts remain intact.  What is wrong
with reductive materialism is that it takes too low a view of matter, for it
sees it in terms of its simplest, lowest level, measurable and publicly
observable properties.  While this approach of methodological
reductionism has provided a quantitative set of models for explicating
natural processes, matter or materiality has much greater potential and
complexity than can be expressed by these models.  Ultimately, matter
will only be fully understood when it is regarded “in its innermost
tendency towards consciousness and realization of value”, that is, when
it is reflected upon from the perspective of its final purposive end, and
not its simplest initial states.20  This implies that efficient causality alone
is not able to fathom the reality of the evolving world: it is only from the
perspective of final causality that the person is able to fathom all-that-is,
not as knowledge, though, but as free response to the call of the wholly
Other, which is the call of the person’s own selfhood, heard in the
human conscience.
2. RAHNER’S NOTION OF ACTIVE SELF-TRANSCENDENCE
The intention of this section is to illustrate just how similar the model
of emergentist monism is to Karl Rahner’s portrait of the unity of spirit
and matter, at the centre of which lies his notion of “active self-
transcendence”.21  Rahner expressly states that talk of the human as
made up of body and soul is a primitive (Platonic) way of viewing
human nature, since we are really made out of “spirit and materia
prima”.22 The problem with talking of “body” and “soul” is that “spirit”
is not yet factored into the equation, with the result that when it is
added the whole tripartite structure is affirmed as the human being.
But, says Rahner, the body is already spirit, it is the expression of the
spirit itself reaching out into space and time; it is always “an entering
into the truly Other”.23  On this view, what is meant by spirit is “an a
priori datum of human knowledge” from which we can determine
                                                                                            
20. Ward, Defending the Soul, 147.
21. Karl Rahner, “The Unity of Spirit and Matter in the Christian Understanding of
Faith”, Theological Investigations 6, 153-77, at 174-76; and “The Body in the Order of
Salvation”, Theological Investigations 17, 71-89.
22. “The Body in the Order of Salvation”, 83.  Rahner follows Thomistic philosophy
here, which in turn follows Aristotelian philosophy, according to which materia prima is
matter which has no form (pure potency).
23. Rahner, “The Body in the Order of Salvation”, 85.
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metaphysically what is really meant by “matter”.24  We cannot begin
with matter and then proceed to discover spirit, for this would be trying
to deduce what is logically and ontologically prior from what is
posterior in both these senses: we must start, in other words, with the
data of self-consciousness.  Rahner thus regards the material as “frozen
spirit”, that is, as limited being, which, outside such a limitation, means
“being-conscious-of-itself, knowledge, freedom, and transcendence
towards God”.25  If matter is to be interpreted as frozen spirit, then,
conversely, this implies a highly material explanation of the finite spirit,
as is made clear by the Christian doctrine of the incarnation of the
eternal Logos.  To Rahner’s mind, the emergence of the human on the
cosmic stage represents a watershed in the evolutionary process since
matter has now transcended itself into self-consciousness before the
living God, but when we turn to the incarnate One this event represents
not only a high point but the final and irrevocable stage in the evolution
of life.  For in the person of Jesus Christ what takes place is the total and
complete acceptance, and thus the radical immanence, of God’s absolute
self-communication to humanity and the world, which is at one and the
same time the definitive transcendence of the movement of creation as a
whole toward the living God.  In order that God’s universal salvific will
toward the world be realised in an historically tangible way, what is
required is that God’s self-bestowal in grace be communicated to an
individual “in such a unique manner that this man would become the
definitive and irreversible self-gift of God to the world”.26  This implies
that Jesus Christ can be thought of as the total actualisation of the
human’s deepest potential as being created in the divine image.
That matter develops dynamically in the direction of spirit is
conveyed by Rahner’s notion of active self-transcendence.  This notion
expresses the understanding that the process of becoming something
qualitatively new is truly a self-transcendence, yet at the same time this
process is the power of absolute being that is “interior” to the finite
being in its becoming, without, however, becoming a constitutive
element of the finite being itself.27  This process of becoming, since it
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26. Rahner, “The One Christ and the Universality of Salvation”, Theological Investigations
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immanence in the world is not merely a conserving power, but a power of becoming in
collaboration with matter.  Rahner bases this notion on the Thomistic doctrine of primary
and secondary causality: God as “primary” cause continually imparts existence at the level
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involves an increase of being proper to the previously existing reality, can
be spoken of as a “leap to a higher nature”.28  If the higher nature
always contains the lower which had prepared the way for the actual
event of self-transcendence, then this implies that the world must be
affirmed as a fundamental unity in which everything is linked to
everything else.  What emerges, in other words, is the need to embrace
an ecological or holistic model wherein all things are viewed as
intimately related to their environments.
It is possible, however, to develop further Rahner’s insistence that
God’s immanence in the world is not merely a conserving power but
also a power of becoming in collaboration with matter, by regarding the
process of active self-transcendence as the work of the divine Spirit.29
The Spirit as the power of becoming in evolutionary history accords
especially well with the biblical view of the Spirit as the giver or
“breath” of life and as indwelling the human spirit, as well as with the
trinitarian view of the Spirit as the principle of God’s self-
communication toward the non-divine other.30  If matter is seen as
developing in the direction of spirit, that is, in the direction of self-
consciousness, freedom, and transcendence toward God, then the notion
of Spirit as the power of becoming in history gives rise to the view that it
is the Spirit who empowers us to enter into union with the living God so
as to satisfy the longings of the human heart.  We can appropriately
speak of the divine-human encounter in terms of the divine Spirit freely
indwelling the human spirit (see Ps 104:29, 30; Rom 8:16), so that by
“spirit” is meant that the human is a personal being capable of
responding in faith, hope, and love to the Spirit of God who breathes life
into the human spirit.  The divine Spirit should not be understood as
resting in the human spirit, though, rather we are to think of the Spirit
as driving the human spirit out of itself in order to realise its full
potentiality: the human spirit is “grasped by something ultimate and
                                                                                                                                    
See Summa Theologica I, ques. 105, art. 5; ques. 10, arts. 4, 8; ques. 45, art. 5; Summa Contra
Gentiles III, chs. 66, 67, 70.
28. Karl Rahner, “Christology Within an Evolutionary View of the World”, Theological
Investigations 5 (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966) 164.
29. This proposition is made by Denis Edwards, The God of Evolution (New York, Mah-
wah: Paulist Press, 1999) 90.
30. Walter Kasper, for example, in The God of Jesus Christ  (London: SCM Press, 1984)
227-28, talks of the Spirit as the internal presupposition of God’s communicability outside
of the ineffable divine being.  Since “the Spirit is divine love in person, he is, first of all, the
source of creation, for creation is the overflow of God’s love and a participation in God’s
being”.  Through the immanent presence of Spirit in the world, then, creation “already has
a supernatural finality and character”.  Christian Duquoc, Dieu different (Paris: Cerf, 1977)
121-22, also views the Spirit as the ecstatic overflow of divine communion toward the non-
divine other, and Yves Congar, in his I Believe in the Holy Spirit, Vol. III (New York: Seabury
Press, 1983) 144-54, talks of the Spirit as “absolute Gift” of divine communion.  Denis
Edwards, in The God of Evolution, draws the conclusion that the work of bringing all
creatures into ecstatic communion with God is “distinctively and properly the role of the
Holy Spirit” (p. 97).
46 PACIFICA 17  (FEBRUARY  2004) 
unconditional”.31  When the Spirit is encountered something happens to
us humans: we receive something More, something new in our being,
which we did not have before.32  The classical term for this being
grasped by the presence of the Spirit who communicates the
overflowing fullness of the divine being to the human person as its own
fulfilment, is ecstasy .  In the perspective of the Christian faith, this Spirit
who freely dwells in the human spirit is “the Spirit of him who raised
Jesus from the dead” (Rom 8:11) and who makes us adopted sons and
daughters of God in the risen Lord so that we cry, “Abba! Father!” (Rom
8:15).
Rahner’s understanding of active self-transcendence as giving rise to
the attainment of a “higher” nature supports the model of emergentist
monism insofar as he maintains that what it is that exists in the one
process of self-transcendence is not identical through time.  Since
qualitatively new species emerge which have greater ontological reality
than the previously existing reality, this implies that it is more
appropriate to speak of “ontological pluralism” rather than follow the
lead of the physicalists who advocate “ontological reductionism”.  The
phenomenon of humanity’s native attunement to transcendent reality in
the Rahnerian perspective also serves to underscore the need to treat the
life of the mind (or spirit) in terms intrinsic to itself; that is, we must
recognise that human thoughts and actions are characterised by
intentionality which has to do with a referring relationship, not a causal
relationship.  The laws and forces of nature have their own integrity, to
be sure, and it is the work of science to study and explain the regular
chain of causal relations in the natural realm, but such causal relations
will prove inadequate to the basic human task of reflecting upon the a
priori question about the totality of reality and its absolute ground.
Rahner expressly acknowledges that God’s continuous activity as
primary cause does not interfere with the actions of a particular creature
as secondary cause, yet at the same time the human subject’s self-
consciousness makes it plain that the world cannot be fathomed apart
from the source and term of transcendence: that is, apart from the
mysterious reality named God whose absolute self-bestowal in grace is
the fulfilment of humanity and the world.  The indwelling of the Spirit
may not be a constitutive element of the human, which allows us to
think of human nature without introducing nonphysical entities (the
Spirit is not a power that can be discovered amongst the laws and forces
of the natural world), yet, on the other hand, without the gratuitous
                                                                                            
31. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, three volumes in one (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1967), Vol. III, 112. See also Jürgen Moltmann, The Coming of God: Christian
Eschatology (London: SCM Press, 1996) 73; and Geoffrey Lampe, God As Spirit (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1977) 34-60.
32. See Martin Buber’s understanding of the divine-human encounter in I And Thou , tr.
Walter Kaufman (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1970) 158.
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presence of the indwelling Spirit driving the human spirit beyond itself
toward new horizons there would be no experience of ongoing
“conversion”, no continuous transformation of the human subject and
his or her world, no truly dynamic quest for the full actualisation of
personal identity in a new “emergent whole” imbued with ultimate
meaning and inviolable goodness.  The fact that human intentionality
points to a referring relationship indicates that the grace-nature
relationship must be reflected upon not in terms of efficient causality,
that is, the production of effects, but along the lines of formal causality
which views God’s gracious self-communication to humanity and the
world as its ontological perfection.  Because Rahner conceives of the
human person as radically open and oriented toward God as its final
end, this implies that integration of all the various levels of that complex
system which is the human-brain-in-the-human-body-in-social-relations
is realised by abandoning oneself to the wholly Other so as to receive
the gift of an “original” identity (real freedom) of which one had been
only dimly aware or had not known at all.  For Rahner, then, human
freedom has identity in God, the absolute ground of all-that-is, as its
determinate content.
3. THE COMPLEX REALITY OF PERSONAL IDENTITY:
INTEGRAL SALVATION IN THE RISEN ONE
One of the most obvious consequences of adopting the position of
emergentist monism and its emphasis on whole-part influence, in
conjunction with Rahner’s understanding of how matter develops in the
direction of spirit, is that it highlights the need today to develop an
ecological or holistic model of the one world in dynamic process.  The
ecological model represents a shift away from substance thinking and
“external” relations towards event thinking, where what is sought is the
“explanation of behaviour at one level in terms of behaviour at other
levels and to recognise that behaviour at one level is to be accounted for
in terms of complex interacting…[which]…is an event, not a sub-
stance”.33   Event thinking views relations as “internal” to events, which
means that things or “substantial objects” are not seen as existing
independently and then subsequently entering into relation with their
environments; rather, the explanation of things is given in terms of the
patterns of interconnectedness among events.  Thus as we move up the
various levels of organisation (electrons, atoms, molecules, cells, tissues,
organs, etc.), we must appreciate that “the properties of each larger
whole are given not merely by the units of which it is composed but by
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the new relations between these units”.34  What happens in the process of
evolution is that the parts themselves are redefined and re-created as we
move from one level to a higher level, hence evolution must be seen as
involving more than a rearrangement of the parts.  This is evident from
the fact that the properties of matter at one level are simply not
applicable at other levels.  An electron in a piece of metal, for example, is
simply not the same as an electron in a cell in the human brain.
But the full meaning of internal relatedness in the holistic model is
highlighted by the way in which we humans take account of our world
and are compelled to respond to it.  The human cannot be fathomed as
merely the product of its genetic endowment and its environment, as
stressed in section 2 above, for the human is always also a creative
response to these given conditions as it earnestly strives to transcend
any given situation in order to meet its unrealised possibilities and
potentialities.  The identity of the self is not something given from the
outset of one’s life, rather personal identity is always a responsive
identity forged through dynamic engagement with the world of
otherness.  On this view, note, being-related is not seen as rooted in
some inner core of the person, but as a modus of being, hence the term
“person” signifies the irreducibility of the human to his or her
individual nature.  The “I” of personal identity is indissolubly tied to the
physical body, to be sure, but it is not reducible to the body.  For the
person goes beyond nature in the dynamic quest for mature selfhood,
while at the same time containing nature, and in this way we can speak
of the individual nature as “enhypostasized”: the person is always a
person in nature, yet transcends nature in its radical orientation toward,
and encounter with, the Other.
What this understanding highlights, first of all, is that human nature
cannot be conceived of as a closed system; it does not refer to a
definitively known quantity, but rather to an unfolding and emerging
reality.  As an emerging reality, we must think of human nature in
dynamic terms as openness to transcendent reality and the quest for a higher
nature.  This movement towards a higher nature involves, as Rahner has
underscored, not only transcendence into something “more” (the
quantitatively more complex) but also transcendence into that which is
substantially “new” (the qualitatively different), so that the process of
becoming is to be regarded as giving rise to an increase of being (greater
ontological reality) to an already existing reality.  The fact that it is
precisely evolving nature that makes the human possible serves to
caution us against thinking of nature in purely essentialist terms, for this
would mean, theologically speaking, that “neither grace nor sin can alter
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the nature of homo sapiens”.35  The reality of sin prevents us humans
from becoming what we ought to be, from actualising our deepest
potential as beings created in the divine image, but the reality of grace,
as our first ontological status, makes possible the attainment of a higher
nature, namely, participation in the very life of God by being drawn up
into the Spirit of the risen Christ who is the new and definitive
“emergent whole” in person.
Secondly, when the human person is reflected upon from the
perspective of emergentist monism, three fundamentally important
points become readily apparent in relation to the doctrine of sin.  To
begin with, the reality of human sin and guilt, which is known in self-
consciousness, cannot be attributed to the lower level biophysical
properties of the human which give rise to natural drives and primal
emotions such as aggression, hatred, vengeance, sexuality, and fear.
These primal emotions are the “tinder of sin” (fomes peccati), to be sure,
in which case it is legitimate to talk of a “natural concupiscence”, but at
the same time they are the “raw materials of holiness”.36 This brings us
to a second point, namely, in light of the “causal” relation from whole to
part (whole-part influence), the reality of sin is to be seen as having
detrimental effects for the entire organism: the disorder brought about
by sin is experienced not only on the psychological and spiritual levels,
but also on the physical and social levels, all of which are
interdependent, though not mutually reducible.  When these first two
points are considered within the framework of the history of the one
world as a history of development and process in which genuinely new
properties emerge through time, then a final point can be made about
the doctrine of sin: the reality of sin is best reflected upon from the perspective
of the dynamics of the Ultimate revealed in Jesus Christ risen who has
conclusively conquered sin as such, so that in his person is proleptically
realised the ontological perfection of the movement of evolving nature
as a whole: Jesus Christ risen is the eschaton in person.  The glorified
body of the crucified-and-risen-One is the reality of the new “emergent
whole” of a “higher” nature which represents the ultimate destiny of the
world-as-a-whole liberated from the shackles of sin and death and
raised to a dignity beyond compare.  Given that an emergentist account
of personhood requires us to consider the effects of sin holistically, then
this implies that the fundamental tenet that Jesus Christ died for the
“forgiveness of sins” must not be interpreted too narrowly as the mere
forgiveness of individual sins: rather, it must be interpreted holistically
as the overcoming of the detrimental effects of sin for the whole complex
system which is the “human-brain-in-the-human-body-in-social-
relations”.  An appropriate understanding of the saving significance of
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Jesus Christ’s life, violent death, and resurrection, will be one that
appreciates the integral character of eschatological salvation in his
person.37  This will be further discussed below in relation to the integral
dimensions of the complex reality of personal identity.
The fact that the reality of sin and guilt is known in self-
consciousness indicates that the basis of responsibility and guilt is to be
sought not in the direction of causality, but in the identity of the human
agent, that is, what the human ought to be.  Only from such a vantage
point is it possible for us to acknowledge our actions as our own and
thus accept personal responsibility for them.  This means that awareness
of the moral imperative must not be seen as a set of demands imposed
from without, but as the call of the person’s own selfhood heard in the
human conscience.38  The call of freedom is a divine call to live as we
ought to live, to harmonise our behaviour with our ultimate destiny in
God, the wholly Other, who is also the mystery that is wholly Present
and closer to us than our own selves.  It is by virtue of our capacity for
self-transcendence that we humans become conscious of the distance
that separates us from what ought to be, from the yet to be realised
possibilities of our dynamic nature in relation to the source and term of
transcendence.  This implies that the doctrine of sin should be
developed from the standpoint of final causality, that is, in terms of “a
still unfinished process which has human identity as its goal”.39  This
eschatological perspective of the dynamics of the ultimate, which
accords particularly well with a christology done within an evolutionary
view of the world, offers us, I believe, the most promising framework
for a rethinking of the doctrine of original sin: the reality expressed by
the term “original sin” can be conceived along the lines of a discrepancy
or disjunction existing between what we humans presently are and what
we are destined to become by being “drawn up” (see John 12:32) into the
reality of Jesus Christ risen, by grace.  “It is the grandeur of the ‘second
Adam’ that explains the ‘transgression’ of the first, who is the symbol of
humanity.”40  In such a perspective, christology rather than original sin
becomes the fundamental axis for the doctrine of soteriology.
Thirdly, on the basis of the understanding of the relationship
between the human spirit and the divine Spirit discussed in section 2
above, this christology must be interpreted dynamically and relationally
in terms of “encounter”, which in turn is to be interpreted in terms of
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mutuality of sharing.  What takes place in the person and history of
Jesus Christ is that the living God meets a fallen humanity in an
“admirable exchange” of natures: human nature is raised to the heights
of the divine nature through the depths of the divine participation in the
human condition.  For the person of Christ bears the imprint of
humanity’s cruelty and estrangement from the Father; the One who is
excluded keeps himself related to those who condemn him to an unjust
death and entrusts himself wholly to the Father in a final prayer of
forgiveness (Luke 23:34) for the “sins of the whole world” (1 John 2:2).
When put to the test, Christ faithfully clings to the Father, he does not
resist evil or turn against anyone in judgement, so that in his person a
fallen humanity might be “raised up” into final union with the Father as
its final end (see John 6:37-40).  Final salvation in the risen One should
therefore be viewed not as the production of effects by a divine person
(whose humanity is “anhypostatic” and thus interpreted
instrumentally), but rather as the drawing up of a fallen humanity into
Christ’s perfect self-abandon to the Father in unfathomable love.  To
participate in the divine identity of the risen One, who is the new
emergent whole since his humanity has entered fully into the dimension
of God, is to be introduced to a higher nature which is qualitatively
different from the previously existing reality.41  What is new in the
Gospel message is God’s free acceptance of a fallen humanity, the
unmerited offer of “new” life in the person of Christ, through the Spirit,
which engenders true conversion of heart and the definitive
establishment of the human’s original identity as being created imago
Dei : real freedom has personal identity in the risen One as its
determinate content.  To sum up, two interrelated affirmations can be
made in regard to eschatological salvation in the risen Christ: salvation
must be considered ontologically, not merely morally, as the goal of the
process of evolving nature; and salvation has an integral character since
everything prior is to be regarded as a preparation for the Christ-event
as the coming together of many events into one unified event.
Fourthly, an effective way, to my mind, of elaborating the integral
character of salvation as participation in the divine identity of Christ, is
to consider it as addressing the integral dimensions of the complex
reality of personal identity, which was touched upon in section 1 of this
essay: the continuity of the person has to do with the length of one’s
history (person as agent), the breadth of one’s relationships (person as
relation), and the depth of one’s self-reflection (person as subject).42  In
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respect of the concept of person as agent, the self is seen not primarily as a
thinker but as a doer: it is by acting that the person seeks to integrate the
complex of intentions, thoughts, and affections, hence individuality
emerges in the unfolding of one’s personal history.43  The individual,
however, never succeeds in enacting and integrating his or her inten-
tions and thoughts fully, since the length of one’s history is finite and
inevitably ends in the helplessness of death.  So what becomes of the
innate desire for personal fulfilment, of the dynamic quest for self-
actualisation in one’s history?  Only if personal being continues beyond
death in some form can the dimension of person as agent be treated in a
meaningful framework.  In light of the understanding that it is by virtue
of our “bodiliness” that we humans go out into the world of otherness
and establish the complex of relationships by which we grow into the
world and we take the world into ourselves, any notion of personal
existence beyond death perforce requires that we think in terms of a
newly embodied self that is fit for the conditions of life in permanent
communion with the glorified Christ.  In this fashion we can view the
concept of person as agent as pointing to the physical dimension of
integral salvation in the risen One.  On the basis of Christ’s conquest of
(physical) death in his being raised from the dead by the Father in the
power of the Spirit, we live in the sure hope that all our strivings and
concerns to realise personal integrity in this life are not in vain but are of
ultimate worth because they are assumed by Christ as his very own; all
our good and meaningful actions are taken up into the new emergent
whole of the glorified Christ who is the new creation.
The concept of person as agent is clearly intimately intertwined with
the concept of person as relation which accentuates the relational aspect of
being a person.44  As a relational being caught up in a web of in-
volvement with others, as a being who seeks to forge personal identity
in relation to others, the self becomes conscious not only of the good to
be found in human life, but also of the pervasive reality of sin and its
complicity with this negative reality which poses a formidable barrier to
the geniune development of the self.  Given that consciousness of
personal sin emerges from personal relationships to others, it follows
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that the person as relation can be seen as corresponding to the moral
dimension of integral salvation in the risen Christ: to be “justified”, to be
“declared” right in one’s standing before God, self, and others, is to be
introduced to a new mode-of-being-in-the-world wherein the “old” self
fades away by allowing the final graciousness of reality to provide the
basic orientation to human life.  This is not to say that the reality of sin is
completely overcome in this life, for we go to our deaths knowing that
we are still sinners, no matter how earnestly we have sought to lead
truly sacramenatal lives.  But this situation clearly raises the question: If
Christ has abolished the powers of sin in the world by his redemptive
death on Calvary, where are we to look for the manifestation of God’s
liberating love in the fullness of its power so that our true relational
identities will shine forth in all their splendour?  In response to this basic
question, I would propose that when the tenet that death is the “wages
of sin” (Rom 6:23) is set in relation to the tenet that the unconditional
forgiveness of sins is through the death of Christ (Col 1:14; Eph 1:7; 1
Cor 15:3; Matt 26:28; the Nicene Creed), then the inference to be drawn
is that the event of our death as a dying into the death of Christ, who has
already assumed our death, should be considered as the privileged
locus for receiving the full saving power of Christ’s conquest of sin as
such, and entering fully into the dimension of God.  Only if this life is
lived in the sure hope that the obstacle of sin will be no more, that God’s
kingdom will come in the fullness of its glory, can we be inspired to
commit our lives to the way of the cross, for the sake of the world.
Finally, the notions of person as agent and person as relation are
incomplete without the concept of person as subject which brings into the
picture the fact that since the person possesses subjectivity, that is, a
relating to self, then personal being involves self-consciousness.45  In
light of this subjectivity, the living God calls each one of us to become an
authentic self by saying “yes” to Absolute Mystery.  But we invariably
hesitate to adopt an attitude of total self-abandon to the mystery of God
given the inherent anxieties we experience as finite existents, and for
fear of giving up what little control we have over our lives.46  The
person as subject can be seen as corresponding to the eschatological
dimension of integral salvation in the risen Christ, given the
understanding that the deepest potential of the human person is actually
realised by freely entering into union with God and sharing in the very
life of God, by grace.  What is in focus here is the term “spirit” in the
sense of self-consciousness and freedom of the human subject who is
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capable of responding in faith, hope, and love to the Spirit of God who is
the absolute ground and precondition of the possibility of all knowing
and all activity in the world.  Personal identity is acquired not only by
interacting with the physical-cosmic and social-cultural environments of
human life, but ultimately by encountering the divine Spirit freely
indwelling the human spirit and driving it beyond itself toward union
with God as its final end.  But granted that real freedom remains ever
precarious in this life given our unstable ontological constitution, that
the “already” exists in dialectical relation to the “not yet”, where are we
to look for the full-flowering of our spiritual nature? Well, I would argue
that when we take the proposition that Christ’s perfect freedom is fully
manifested and realised in that he bears the sin of the world on Calvary
for our sake, and set it in relation to the teaching that sin is the
perversion of freedom, then it is reasonable to infer that we should
consider the event of our own death, as a dying into the saving death of
Christ, as the gateway to the definitive establishment of personal
freedom by our being drawn up into Christ’s perfect freedom of total
self-abandon to the Father in unfathomable love.
In conclusion, from the foregoing discussion of how the three integral
dimensions of personal identity relate to the three dimensions of integral
salvation in the risen Christ, the proposition can be formulated that
death is a final condition corresponding to the real nature of grace as
God’s gratuitous self-bestowal in the person of Christ (the divine exitus),
and to the real nature of the human person as the event of God’s self-gift
in grace (the human reditus), which definitively establishes the original
identity of the human created in the divine image, to the glory of God.47
The various dimensions of integral salvation in Christ must be thought
of not as a chronological or linear sequence of causal events, but as
forming a pattern of interconnected events which are “internal” to the
transformative encounter with Christ who is the new emergent whole in
person.  Since in the ecological-holistic model the properties of each
larger whole are given not only by the units of which it is composed but
also by the new relations between these units, we can imagine that as we
move from the pilgrim state to the final condition of death as the
privileged locus for receiving the gift of “admirable exchange” of
natures in the person of Christ, we actually enter into a “new” set of
relations to God, self, humanity, and the cosmos, in that ultimate
complex system which is participation in the glorified humanity of
Christ; that is, the risen life.
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